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ABSTRACT  
Small firms that offer health insurance to their employees may face variable premiums if 
the firm hires an employee with high-expected health costs. To avoid expensive premium 
variability, a small firm may attempt to maintain a workforce with low-expected health 
costs. In addition, workers with high-expected health costs may prefer employment in 
larger firms with health insurance rather than in smaller firms. This results in 
employment distortions. We examine the magnitude of these employment distortions in 
hiring, employment, and separations, using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey from 
1996 to 2001. Furthermore, we examine the effect of state small group health insurance 
reforms that restrict insurers’ ability to deny coverage and restrict premium variability on 
employment distortions in small firms relative to large firms. We find that workers with 
high-expected health cost are less likely to be new hires in small firms that offer health 
insurance, and are less likely to be employed in insured small firms. However, we find no 
evidence that state small group health insurance reforms have reduced the extent of these 
distortions. Estimating the magnitude of employment distortions in insured small firms is 
essential in refining reforms to the small group health insurance market.    
 
  The difficulties that small firms face in obtaining and maintaining health 
insurance for their employees have been widely documented (Brown, Hamilton and 
Medoff, 1990; McLaughlin,1992; Fronstin and Helman, 2000). Only 45% of firms with 
fewer than 50 employees offer health insurance compared to 97% of firms with 50 or 
more employees (AHRQ, 2002). This low proportion has been attributed, in part, to the 
high administrative cost of health insurance for small firms, the low demand for 
insurance among workers in these firms, and the unwillingness of insurers to take on 
small firm risks (McLaughlin, 1992, Fronstin and Helman, 2000, Monheit and Vistnes, 
1999). 
  In recent decades, small firms that provide health insurance to their employees 
were in a precarious position. Their premiums were calculated yearly, based on the 
expected value of their health care utilization. Hence, a single high cost employee could 
lead to a substantial surcharge on the premiums for the firm (Zellers, McLaughlin, and 
Frick, 1992). In a survey of small employers that did not offer health insurance, 75 
percent claimed that an important reason for not offering insurance was high premium 
variability (Morrisey, Jensen and Morlock, 1994). Concerns about these problems fueled 
the passage of numerous state small group health insurance reforms in the 1990s that 
implemented premium rating reforms and restrictions on pre-existing condition 
exclusions. While a few states have implemented premium rating reform that has 
severely restricted small group insurers’ ability to use health status to set premiums, in 
most states, these reforms have been moderate. 
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  Assuming that firms are unable to perfectly tailor individual wages to individual 
health insurance costs, unexpectedly high premiums may impose a large burden on small 
firms. Paying high premiums, possibly financed by borrowing at high interest rates, may 
increase the risk of bankruptcy. If small firms choose not to pay high premiums, and 
instead drop insurance coverage, they renege on the implicit compensation contract with 
workers. Employers may opt to raise employee contributions to cover higher costs but 
large increases may lead to healthier employees dropping coverage. Faced with this 
predicament, small firms may choose to prevent expensive premium variability by 
maintaining a work force that has a low-expected utilization of health care services. Thus, 
the link between employment and health insurance in small firms may result in a welfare 
loss if it prevents individuals with high-expected health costs from being employed in 
small firm jobs in which they may have high match specific productivity.  
  Employers may obtain information about employees’ medical conditions in 
several ways. Before the passage of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
half of all employers conducted pre-employment medical examinations (U.S. Congress, 
1988). Most small group employers required the completion of a family health 
questionnaire for insurance coverage (Zellers et al., 1992, Cutler 1994). While ADA now 
restricts employer inquiries on employee health, it does not apply to firms with under 15 
employees.  In addition, employer compliance with the ADA may be hindered because its 
stipulations about pre-employment health inquiries are vague. Medical inquires are 
allowed if they pertain to the applicant’s ability to perform the job. In addition, medical 
information is explicitly allowed in the use of medical underwriting for insurance 
(Epstein, 1996). The media continues to report cases where employers easily obtain 
  3   
employee medical records (Rubin, 1998), or employees have been laid-off because of 
high health costs (O’Connor, 1996), or employee premiums have been adjusted to reflect 
the employee’s claims experience (Kolata, 1992).  
  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
includes a nondiscrimination provision that bars a group health plan or issuer from 
discriminating in eligibility or contributions on the basis of a health status-related factor. 
However, HIPAA allows medical underwriting and allows insurers to rate groups of 
employees based on health status as long as the premium rate for all employees is 
blended. This stipulation prevents employers from requiring higher cost employees to 
contribute a higher premium share, but does not shield employers from bearing the costs 
for a sick worker.   
  Economists have typically believed that health insurance is an attribute of “good 
jobs” and workers do not choose jobs based on whether or not the job provides health 
insurance. In fact, this precept is behind the notion that employment is a mechanism for 
minimizing adverse selection in the market for health insurance (see, for example, Gruber 
and Levitt, 2000). However, a number of recent studies have suggested that worker 
demand for health insurance may play an important role in employment decisions. 
Workers with high-expected family costs may prefer jobs that offer health insurance, and 
conversely, workers with low preferences for health insurance may sort into jobs that lack 
health insurance. (Monheit and Vistnes, 1999, Monheit and Vistnes, 2006, Royalty and 
Abraham, 2005, Bundorf and Pauly, 2004).  
  In this paper, we use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from 1996 to 
2001 to examine the magnitude of employment distortions for workers with high-
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expected health costs. Since health insurance and employment are linked, health 
insurance may be an important determinant of employment outcomes.  High-expected 
health costs may reduce the probability that workers are employed in firms where they 
have the highest match specific productivity. We estimate the magnitude of distortions in 
hiring, employment, and separations. Furthermore, we examine the effect of state small 
group health insurance reforms that restrict insurers’ ability to deny coverage and restrict 
premium variability on employment distortions in small firms relative to large firms. 
Estimating the magnitude of employment distortions in insured small firms and 
understanding the effect of small group regulation on these distortions is essential in 
deciding optimal public policy towards the small group health insurance market. 
 
Literature Review 
  The first literature that is relevant to this paper relates to small firms and health 
insurance. Cutler (1994) finds evidence that small firms are subject to a higher degree of 
premium variability than large firms. Moreover, small firms with young workers, high 
turnover or low wages tend to have the highest premium variability. The possibility of 
employment screening as a result of the incentives created by the small group health 
insurance market has been previously noted in the literature (Aaron and Bosworth, 1994; 
Madrian, 1994). Monheit and Vistnes (1994) find that the risk selection practices of 
insurers segment the small-group market so that only persons who are favorable health 
risks obtain employment related insurance. They find that the employees and dependents 
with coverage from small firm policies are in better health than those with non-group 
polices (when firm coverage was not available) or those who had no coverage. While 
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these results may indicate the presence of employment distortions due to health 
insurance, it is also possible that we may see these results if individuals in good jobs that 
offer health insurance are in better health than those who are not offered health insurance. 
Olson (1993) finds that individuals who say that they are in bad health are far less likely 
to have health insurance in industries that have a high proportion of small firms than in 
industries that have a high proportion of large firms. Using the 1987 NMES data, Kapur 
(2004) finds evidence of employment distortions in small firms that is consistent with 
underwriting rules in the small group health insurance market. Extension of this analysis 
to the 1996 MEPS is limited by the relatively small sample sizes of insured workers with 
adverse health conditions. Although not focused on small firms, Buchmueller (1995) 
finds that men in worse health are less likely to be insured. 
  Another relevant literature examines the impact of health insurance costs on 
wages and employment. There is evidence to suggest that rising health insurance costs 
have led to firms increasing hours worked by employees rather than employing more 
workers (Cutler and Madrian, 1998). Other work shows that for certain groups, the wages 
and the probability of being hired are sensitive to health insurance costs (Gruber, 1995; 
Sheiner, 1995; Scott, Berger and Garen, 1995). However, several recent papers fail to 
find robust evidence of the expected relationship between wages and health insurance 
(Jensen and Morrisey, 2001; Levy and Feldman, 2001; Simon, 2001).  
  Using the 1987 NMES data and the 2000 MEPS data, Monheit and Vistnes (1999, 
2004) provide evidence that worker preferences play a role in employer provided health 
insurance, showing that workers with low preferences for health insurance sort into firms 
that do not offer health insurance. Royalty and Abraham (2006) demonstrate that workers 
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with access to spouse health insurance sort into jobs that do not offer health insurance, 
again suggesting that worker demand for health insurance may play an important role in 
job choice. Bundorf and Pauly (2004) also find evidence that individuals who have high-
expected health costs are more likely to obtain health insurance in the group market and 
in the individual health insurance market. 
  Research on the impact of state small group health insurance reform generally has 
shown a small effect or no effect on small firms’ propensity to offer health insurance or 
on employees’ insurance coverage (Sloan and Conover, 1998; Jensen and Morrissey, 
1996; Zuckerman and Rajan, 1999; Monheit and Schone, 1998; Buchmueller and 
DiNardo, 2002; Hall, 1999; Marquis and Long, 2002). However, a few studies do find 
modest effects of the reforms on insurance (Uccello, 1996; Hing and Jensen, 1999; 
Simon, 2005; Buchmueller and Jensen, 1997). In addition, some work has demonstrated 
that stronger reforms increased insurance coverage for high risk workers relative to low 
risk workers (Monheit and Schone, 1998, Davidoff et al., 2005). Most of these studies 
exploit cross-sectional and time-series variation in the implementation of state reforms to 
identify the effect of the reform on insurance coverage and do not focus on analyzing 
employment and employment flows in small and large firms as a result of the reforms. 
Two existing studies examine the labor market effects of small group health insurance 
reform and find small or no effects; however, neither of these studies has access to 
detailed family health data (Simon and Kaestner, 2002; Kapur, 2003). 




  There are several reasons that the health insurance market may distort 
employment decisions in small firms. If providing health insurance for workers with 
high-expected health costs is more expensive for small firms, they may screen out high 
cost workers. Furthermore, small firms may be in a better position to screen out high cost 
employees compared to larger firms. On the other hand, workers with high-expected 
health costs are expected to prefer jobs that offer health insurance. The existence of 
employment distortions is predicated on the assumption that firms are unable to perfectly 
tailor individual compensation to health insurance costs. Minimum wage laws, HIPAA 
non-discrimination provisions, and notions of fairness and equity are likely to prevent 
adjustment of wages at the individual level. We consider several theoretical reasons why 
small firms may choose to screen out workers with high-expected health costs. We also 
consider the rationale behind sorting based on worker demand. 
First, the health insurance market may lead to employment distortions in small 
firms by creating premium variability. If small firms hire randomly from an available 
pool of workers, they will face a more variable health insurance premium bill. Therefore, 
small firms are likely to be more sensitive to the presence of a high-cost worker because 
they are less able to diversify health insurance premium costs internally than larger 
firms.
1  Assuming that firms are unable to fully pass on the premium bill to workers, at 
least in the short run, unexpectedly high premiums may be expensive for firms since they 
                                                 
1 Small firms should have a greater incentive to insure against inter-temporal premium changes; 
however, the market for inter-temporal insurance is inadequate (Cutler, 1994). Since the 1990s, small group 
health insurance reforms may have improved the availability of inter-temporal insurance. 
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may have to borrow to finance the high premiums. Employers may opt to raise employee 
contributions to cover higher costs but large increases may lead to healthier employees 
dropping coverage. To avoid the cost of high health insurance premiums, small firms 
may choose to screen out workers that are likely to cause their group health insurance 
premiums to be high.  
Second, it is possible that the administrative cost of charging each employee his 
or her health insurance cost may be large. As a result, firms may elect to charge each 
employee the average health insurance cost of the employee pool. If the search costs of 
finding a new job are higher than the extra share of health insurance costs, healthy 
workers will not quit. This pooling strategy implies that large firms can spread the high 
health insurance costs of one worker over their entire employee pool. However, small 
firms are unlikely to be able to successfully employ this strategy since health insurance 
costs are spread over a much smaller number of workers. As a result, small firms may be 
compelled to charge each employee his or her own health insurance costs, or to screen 
out high cost employees.  
Third, small firms are likely to have higher health insurance costs than large 
firms. Specifically, administrative costs decrease dramatically with firm size. 
Administrative costs are about 40 percent of claims paid in very small firms (under 5 
employees), while they are only 5.5 percent of claims paid in the largest firms with 
10,000 or more employees (Helms, Gauthier, and Campion, 1992). A worker with high 
health costs may be more expensive to insure in a small firm due to the fact that the 
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administrative costs of processing claims is relatively larger for small firms than for large 
firms.
2
Fourth, small firms may have a lower cost of screening out sick employees. It is 
likely that employment decisions are centralized in the hands of a single entrepreneur in a 
small firm. In contrast, employment decisions are more likely to be decentralized in large 
firms. The single entrepreneur in a small firm may find it easier to screen out an 
individual with high-expected health costs.
3 Moreover, most small firms are required to 
provide data on the family health status of potential employees to their health insurance 
companies (U.S. Congress, 1988). This implies that the information required for 
employment screening is readily available to small firms, and that coupled with 
centralized decision making, results in individuals with high-expected health costs being 
more likely to be screened out of small firms than large firms. 
Worker demand for health insurance may also affect employment outcomes. 
Workers with high-expected health costs value jobs that provide health insurance more 
than other workers. Bhattacharya and Vogt (2006) have developed a model for worker 
sorting due to health insurance demand. In this model, workers with poor health prefer 
jobs that offer health insurance, however job switching costs may prevent some from 
moving to insured jobs. In addition to simply preferring insured jobs, workers with high-
                                                 
2 The lower administrative costs in large firms may be due to the fact that large firms tend to have 
a benefits manager to coordinate health claims and complete paperwork and there are economies of scale in 
coordination. The benefits office in large firms acts as an intermediary between employees and insurers, 
reducing administrative burden for large firm insurers. Large firms are also less likely to drop insurance 
resulting in lower transition costs for insurance companies. 
3 It is also possible that small firms may have a relative advantage in wage adjustment compared 
to large firms. However, there are several reasons that a small firm employer may find it as hard as a large 
firm to adjust wages. First, both small and large firms are subject to minimum wage laws that impede their 
ability to adjust wages beyond a point. Given that health expenditures can be very high, this may be a 
binding constraint even for higher wage workers. Second, jobs are often advertised with wage ranges 
making it problematic to adjust wages after a position is advertised. Third, different wages for similar jobs 
within a firm may result in employee dissatisfaction and so, may be less preferred as an adjustment 
strategy. 
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expected health costs may prefer insured large firm jobs to small firm jobs. The greater 
stability of large firm jobs and the increased plan choice in large firms may play a role in 
worker sorting. In addition, even though health insurance policy quality is similar across 
small and large firms along many important dimensions, small firm policies tend to have 
higher deductibles, and this feature may discourage workers with high expected expenses 
from seeking insured small firm jobs.
4 Health insurance policy quality may also be 
viewed as a tool for small firms to discourage workers with high expected health costs 
from seeking employment, and therefore act as an implicit employer screening 
mechanism.  
 
State Small Group Health Insurance Reform 
  During the 1990s, most states implemented small group health insurance reform. 
These reforms tended to include the following components: guaranteed issue/renewal 
laws that mandated that insurance companies issue/renew some or all health insurance 
policies for small firms; portability and pre-existing condition limitation reforms that 
limited the time that insurers could exclude coverage for certain medical conditions; and 
premium rating reforms that restricted the factors that could be used to set health 
insurance premiums and restricted premium variability.  Detailed descriptions of these 
reforms are in Kapur (2003). In 1996, the federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) mandated guaranteed issue of health insurance for small 
                                                 
4 The Kaiser-HRET employer surveys on health insurance benefits have showed that there are no 
statistically significant differences among small firm plans and large firm plans in their offerings of 
prescription drugs, adult physicals, outpatient mental, inpatient mental, annual OB/GYN visit, oral 
contraceptives, and well-baby care. Only the propensity to offer prenatal care and chiropractic care differed 
significantly. Small firm policies were more likely to have no policy limit (60% in small firms and 45% in 
large firms) and more likely to have a limit on out of pocket spending than large firm policies (87% in 
small firms and 77% in large firms), and more likely to have higher deductibles ($559 in large firms and 
$280 in small firms for single coverage) (Kaiser-HRET, 2004). 
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firms starting in 1997. For many states, the existing state small group reform was 
equivalent to HIPAA’s provisions; however, for others HIPAA’s mandates changed the 
guarantee issue requirements. 
Theoretically, the effect of state small group health insurance reforms and HIPAA 
on employment outcomes for workers with high-expected health costs is ambiguous. 
Firm screening and worker demand may exert opposing effects on employment 
outcomes. Pre-existing condition limitations may increase insured small firms’ screening 
of individuals with adverse family health conditions since these health conditions must be 
covered by health insurance. On the other hand, since pre-existing condition limitation 
reforms lead to more extensive small firm health insurance coverage, these reforms may 
increase worker demand for small firm health insurance. However, ultimately, the worker 
response depends on workers’ valuation of the additional health benefit relative to the 
cost in terms of reduced wages and/or higher health insurance premiums. Rating reforms 
that regulate premium variability and use of health factors in setting premiums can be 
expected to reduce the higher premiums associated with adverse health. Therefore, these 
reforms should increase insured small firm employment of workers with high-expected 
health costs. However, if low risk workers and/or firms leave the market in response to 
the higher premiums, average market premiums may increase and discourage some high 
risk workers from seeking insured small firm employment. Guaranteed issue reforms are 
important in their interaction with rating reforms, since they mandate that insurers must 
continue to offer health insurance to small firms even at the newly regulated premiums. 
Without guarantee issue reform, rating reforms are toothless since insurers can cherry-
pick low cost firms. Reforms were passed in packages in all states -- the theoretical effect 
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of these reform packages on the employment distortions for individuals with adverse 





We use the Household Component of the 1996 – 2001 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS) conducted by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality. The 
MEPS has an overlapping panel design, in which the sample selected in any given year is 
followed for two calendar years (Cohen 2000). Each family in the Household Component 
participated in five rounds of data collection over a two-year period. During each round, 
information on all family members’ employment (including size of employer) and health 
insurance coverage (including whether employer-provided health insurance was offered) 
was collected. In addition, a detailed set of variables on health, demographics, and health 
utilization was collected.   
We also use a state small group reform database constructed using the information 
in Simon (2005), Kapur (2003), and Marquis and Long (2002). Our primary reform 
measure is a three category variable: no/weak reform, moderate reform or full reform. 
States with guaranteed issue reform and rating reform that restricted premium variability 
using rate bands were classified as having moderate reform. States with guaranteed issue 
and rating reform that included community rating or modified community rating were 
coded has having full reform. All other states were classified as having no reform or 
weak reform. We experimented with a host of other specifications for the reforms. We 
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coded individual components of the reforms such as guaranteed issue reform, rating and 
portability/pre-existing condition exclusion reforms (Kapur, 2003, Marquis and Long 
2002). We also used a measure of premium variability allowed by the rating reforms. We 
developed several alternative measures of the package of reforms based on the extent of 
allowable premium variability, guaranteed issue and renewal reforms. After the 
implementation of HIPAA, all states were coded as having guaranteed issue reforms.  
The public use MEPS data do not include an identifier for state of residence; 
therefore, we conducted the state reform analysis at the AHRQ Data Center in Rockville, 
MD., where we had access to a database that merged our reform variables to the MEPS-
HC analysis files. 
 
Econometric Framework: Employment Distortions 
We estimate the magnitude of three types of employment distortions: (a) Hiring 
Distortions: Are small firms that offer health insurance less likely to hire workers with 
sick families?, (b) Employment Stock Distortions:  Are small firms that offer health 
insurance less likely to employ workers with sick families?, (c) Separation Distortions: 
Are small firm more likely to layoff insured workers with sick families?  
To estimate the magnitude of the employment distortion, employees in small 
firms with health insurance should be compared to employees who have similar 
observable job and demographic characteristics but work in larger firms. The means 
presented in table 1 show the characteristics of employees in four groups -- those 
employed in small firms that offer health insurance, large firms that offer health 
insurance, small firms that do not offer health insurance and large firms that do not offer 
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health insurance. For most demographic and job characteristics, such as age, sex, marital 
status, education, and wage, employees in small firms with health insurance are more 
similar to employees in large firms with health insurance than to employees without 
health insurance. Therefore, the preferred comparison group for insured small firm 
workers is insured large firm workers. However, there are several statistically significant 
differences in job and demographic attributes between insured small firm workers and 
insured large firm workers. The model estimation controls for these differences.  
 
Hiring  Distortions 
To test whether hiring distortions exist, we estimate a multinomial logit model 
with a four-level dependent variable, Yi, with different values for each of the following 
employment outcomes: small firm worker and offered health insurance, large firm worker 
and offered health insurance, small firm worker and not offered health insurance, and 
large firm worker and not offered health insurance.
 5  
() ) ' * ( Pr j i i j j i Z HC f j Y γ β α + + = =  
HC denotes the expected health costs. The sample consists of all workers who had tenure 
of less than one year at the interview date.
6 We construct three measures of expected 
health costs. These include a count of medical conditions in the family, an indicator for 
the presence of any family medical conditions, and an index of expected health costs (log 
                                                 
5 The health insurance offer question asks if the person was offered health insurance through the 
employer. The employment size question asks the number of employees at the person’s establishment of 
employment. Since health insurance decisions are likely to be made on the basis of firm size rather than 
establishment size, we also used a question that asked if the firm had multiple locations to restrict the 
sample to single location firms where the categorization of small vs. large employer based on firm size is 
identical to the categorization based on establishment size. The results were similar to those including all 
establishments. 
6 Our models of hiring distortions would not capture the form of employment distortion in which 
an individual is potentially unemployed due to higher expected health costs. 
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transformed) based on family medical conditions. We focused on medical conditions that 
were chronic, persistent measures of health, since temporary shocks to health are likely to 
have a much smaller effect on employment outcomes.
7 The matrix Z consists of control 
variables.  Demographic controls include schooling, sex, age, age squared, marital status, 
race, family size, and spouse work status.
  We also included job controls – industry 
indicators, occupation indicators, wage and union status, and region, MSA and year 
indicators. Since job controls are possibly endogenous to the employment outcome, we 
also ran these models excluding the job controls and found very similar results.
8
  We estimated the model on three samples – the full sample, single workers, and 
married workers. Models for married workers included an additional set of control 
variables that captured the characteristics of the worker’s spouse. These included spouse 
education and spouse employment characteristics (wage, union, industry and occupation) 
if employed. Married workers may have a muted worker sorting response, since their 
sorting behavior is affected by their own characteristics and by spouse characteristics. 
Furthermore, the health effects for married workers hinge on both own and dependent 
health, whereas for single workers, the health effects depend solely on own health. 
Therefore, separate models for single and married workers may be informative. For 
married workers, we also estimated an additional model that disaggregated family health 
into worker and dependent health. Poor worker health may result in a stronger 
                                                 
7 We used the following adult medical conditions:  angina, MI, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, stroke, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, obesity, liver disease, depression, HIV, renal disease, CHF, 
hypertension, hyperlipidemia, anxiety, psychological disorder, irritable bowel disease, epilepsy, thyroid 
disease, ulcers, migraine. We used the following child conditions: asthma, diabetes, sinusitis, upper 
respiratory infections, seizures, cerebral palsy, mental retardation, cancer, appendicitis, hemanemia, 
congenital heart disease, renal disease, UTI, depression, ADHD, otitis media, and acne. 
8 One concern is that health may be important due to the physical demands of the job. As a check, 
we included interactions of the occupation and industry indicators with worker health, and found that the 
results on family health were robust.
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employment distortion than poor dependent health since the former is likely to be more 
readily observable.  
We constructed the index of expected health costs by estimating separate models 
for adult and child medical expenditures on the sub-sample of individuals with private 
health insurance using a one-part generalized least squares model with a gamma 
distribution and a square root link.
9 This model provided the best fit for health costs 
(Manning and Mullahy, 2001). The health cost models included a full set of medical 
condition indicators and controls for demographic variables. Coefficients on medical 
conditions from these models provided the weights used to construct the predicted cost 
index.
 10 A concern with this model is that health insurance could be endogenously 
determined. Given that we have no suitable instrumental variables in our data set, we are 
unable to adjust for selection formally. However, we use multiple measures of health, and 
only one of them is subject to an endogeneity concern. Comparing results across the 
various health measures provides a natural robustness check. 
The multinomial logit model treats both small firm employment and health 
insurance as endogenous variables that are jointly incorporated into the four-level 
dependent variable. A Hausman test shows that assumption of the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives cannot be rejected in this application. We correct the standard 
errors for clustering within family.  
We use the estimates from the multinomial logit model to compare the effect of 
HC on insured small firm new hires to its effect on insured large firm new hires by 
                                                 
9 We found virtually identical results when we used expected health plan payments as an 
alternative dependent variable in the models.   
10 To reduce the possible endogeneity of medical conditions with respect to policy quality and job 
change, we re-specify the health measures to include only those conditions that are discovered before the 
survey year. We find no qualitative change in the results. 
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reporting relative risk ratios (RRR) for insured small firm employment with insured large 
firm employment as the base category. As discussed earlier, this strategy enables us to 
compare groups that are comparable in demographic and job characteristics. The RRR 
based on β, the coefficient of interest, is the effect of the expected health cost of a worker 
on the probability that he or she is employed in an insured small firm relative to an 
insured large firm. We would expect this RRR to be less than 1 and significant if 
individuals with high-expected health costs are less likely to be employed at small firms 
with health insurance. 
  Even if employees in small firms with health insurance are found to have lower 
expected health costs than those in large firms with health insurance, this result could be 
attributed to all small firms being less likely to employ sick workers. For example, if 
small firms have only a single worker experienced in a certain task, absenteeism due to 
sickness could be a bigger problem for a small firm and they may prefer to employ 
healthier workers, irrespective of health insurance. Alternatively, a worker demand story 
may suggest that workers with high-expected health costs prefer insured large firm jobs 
to insured small firm jobs because they are more stable and have greater health plan 
choice. Therefore, we compare the effect of health on the probability of being in a small 
firm with health insurance with the effect of health on the probability of being in a small 
firm without health insurance using estimates from the multinomial logit model. 
  We also use the estimates from the multinomial logit model to demonstrate the 
effect of health on the probability of being employed in a large firm that offers health 
insurance compared to the probability of being hired in a large firm that does not offer 
health insurance. These results can be compared to those that contrast small firms with 
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health insurance to small firms without health insurance to show that effects of health on 
being hired into a small firm with health insurance are not generalizable to large firms. 
Table 2 presents the results from the multinomial logit models. The models vary 
in their definition of firm size (less than 25 employees vs. less than 50 employees), in 
their family health measures (number of family conditions, whether there are any family 
conditions, and predicted medical expenditures), and in their estimation sample (full 
sample, single workers, and married workers). The first two columns contain the results 
for insured small firm workers relative to the base category of insured large firm workers. 
The third and fourth columns contain results for insured small firm workers relative to 
uninsured small firm workers, and the last two columns contain results for insured large 
firm workers relative to uninsured large firm workers. Significance tests for RRRs test 
the difference of the RRR from 1.
11  
For the full sample, the results in columns 1 and 2 show that workers with adverse 
family health are significantly less likely to be employed in insured small firms relative to 
insured large firms. This result is statistically significant for five of the six full sample 
models in columns 1 and 2. For the indicator for “any conditions” in the model where 
small firms are defined as those that employ less than 25, the relative risk of being an 
insured small firm worker relative to an insured large firm worker is 86% as a result of 
having a family medical condition. The RRRs in columns 3 and 4 show that workers with 
sick families are less likely to be new hires in small firms that offer health insurance 
relative to small firms that do not offer health insurance. This comparison shows that 
hiring workers with healthy families is not simply a characteristic of all small firms. For 
                                                 
11 The relative risk ratio for insured small firm employment relative to insured large firm 
employment for the number of conditions measures the effect of a one-unit increase in conditions on 
Prob(Insured Small Firm Worker)/Prob(Insured Large Firm Worker). 
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the full sample, columns 5 and 6 show that there is no effect of family health on whether 
workers are new hires in large firms that offer health insurance. However, for the married 
sample, there is some evidence that families with poor dependent health are more likely 
to be insured new hires in large firms compared to uninsured new hires in large firms.  In 
summary, the results from table 2 show that workers with adverse family health are less 
likely to be hired into small firms that offer health insurance compared to any other type 
of firm. The full results from the multinomial logit models reported in the paper are 
available on request.
12
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of health is the same for the single 
and married samples, and in several cases, the results become more imprecise after 
disaggregating the sample.
13 However, the results appear stronger for single individuals 
who are not likely to have access to alternative sources of employment-based coverage. 
For small firms under 50, disaggregating the health measures into worker and family 
components shows that worker health appears to have a statistically significant effect 
whereas dependent health tends to have a statistically insignificant effect, consistent with 
the notion that worker health is more readily observable to employers. However, in most 
cases, we are unable to reject the possibility that worker health has a statistically different 
effect from dependent health. 
 
                                                 
12 In general, the effect of age on employment distortions is quite different from the effect of 
health, even though age and health are correlated. Age is correlated with seniority, experience, and human 
capital accumulation. Therefore, even though age is correlated with health, we cannot make clear 
predictions about how insured small firms will value older workers compared to younger workers. 
13 We found some evidence that workers with spouses who were employed and those who had 
spouses belonging to unions were more likely to be new hires in insured small firm jobs compared to 
insured large firm jobs. However, most of the spousal variables were statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, controlling for spousal characteristics does not change the effect of health on employment 
among married individuals. 
  20   
Stock Distortions  
We estimate multinomial logit models to test employment distortions in the stock 
of employees, following the same structure as the models for new hires.
14 For the full 
sample, the results in table 3 show that workers with unhealthy families are less likely to 
be employed in small firms that offer health insurance compared to large firms that offer 
health insurance. For the full sample, this result is statistically significant for five of the 
six models presented in columns 1 and 2. For the indicator for “any conditions” in the 
model where small firms are defined as those that employ less than 25, the relative risk of 
being an insured small firm worker relative to an insured large firm worker is 91% as a 
result of a having a family medical condition.  
Even though the point estimates for the full sample suggest that workers with sick 
families are less likely to be employed in small firms that offer health insurance 
compared to small firms that do not, these estimates are not statistically significant. For 
the full sample, the results that compare workers in large firms that offer health insurance 
to workers in large firms that do not offer health insurance show no consistent pattern on 
the employment of workers with sick families.  We expect that the largest effect of health 
would occur at the time of hiring; therefore, it is not surprising that the effects for all 
employees are slightly weaker than those for new hires. 
As with the new hire analysis, the results in columns 1 and 2 appear stronger for 
single individuals than for married individuals, although in most cases the effects are not 
statistically different. In columns 3 and 4, sicker single workers appear to be significantly 
less likely to be employed in insured small firms compared to uninsured small firms (for 
                                                 
14 The sample used in estimating models for the stock of all workers includes workers who have 
tenure of less than one year (the new hire sample). 
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the under 50 definition). In several models that contrast insured small firms with 
uninsured small firms and insured large firms with uninsured large firms, we find that 
poor dependent health increases the likelihood of being in an insured firm, consistent 
with the notion that families with poor health have a higher demand for insured jobs. 
 
Separation Distortion 
Ex ante, we do not expect separation distortions to be large since separations are 
costly in terms of lost on-the-job training and unemployment insurance taxes. Firms 
should prefer to screen at the time of the hiring decision, and workers should prefer to 
make decisions on their preferred jobs at the time of hiring. However, given that expected 
health costs at the time of hiring could be lower than the expected costs at a later date due 
to imperfect information about future health costs, separation distortions could be 
present.  
  To test the importance of layoff and quit distortions, we determine if workers with 
high family health costs employed in small firms with health insurance are more likely to 
be laid-off or more likely to quit than workers in small firms without health insurance and 
workers in large firms. Unlike the hiring distortion estimation, here the desired insurance 
variable is whether or not a worker holds employer provided health insurance. It is not an 
indicator of whether a worker was offered health insurance, since only individuals who 
hold health insurance contribute to employers' health insurance costs.  
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We estimate a multinomial logit model where Y, the job transition, can take any 
of three values denoted by j – stay, layoff, or quit.
15 The sample consists of individuals 
employed at any time during the sample period.  
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where Z is the vector of controls. HC is a vector of expected health costs, and HI denotes 
employer provided health insurance. If small firms screen high cost workers, the 
coefficient on the interaction of expected health cost, small firm and health insurance, δj, 
would be positive when j denotes a layoff, assuming that wages are relatively inflexible. 
Alternatively, if wages are flexible, we expect that β3j would depend on worker valuation 
of health insurance relative to wages when j denotes a quit.
16  
Since insured small firm workers are most similar to insured large firm workers, 
we determine the sensitivity of our results to this specification by re-estimating this 
model on only insured workers, and estimating the effect of interest with an interaction 
term between small firm employment and adverse health. We also re-estimate the model 
only on small firm workers, and examine the interaction between adverse health and 
health insurance to determine if sickness has a differential effect on insured small firm 
workers compared to uninsured small firm workers.   
                                                 
15 Using a Hausman test, we determined that this model did not violate the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption of the multinomial logit model. 
16 The separation analysis bears some similarity to the job lock literature. Like the job lock 
literature, our models focus on workers with a high demand for health care in insured firms; however, 
unlike the job lock literature, we contrast small and large firms. If individuals in insured small firms have 
worse policies and are less likely to be subject to job lock than individuals in insured large firms, we may 
expect the results in the separation models to be affected by job lock. However, evidence from the Kaiser-
HRET survey suggests that policies in small and large firms are quite similar. Furthermore, the literature on 
job lock is quite mixed, and several studies suggest that job lock may be quite small (Kapur 1998, Gilleskie 
and Lutz, 2002). 
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Table 4 presents the results from the multinomial logit models for separations. We 
present results for the full sample, single workers, and married workers. Our results for 
the sample of all workers (insured and uninsured), in the first set of columns, show that 
workers with families with adverse health who are employed in small firms with health 
insurance are less likely to quit their jobs and are also less likely to be laid off. The three 




th percentiles of the distribution.
17 The marginal effects show small and 
negative effects on separations. For the insured sub-sample, these results are only 
statistically significant when small firms are defined as employing less than 50 workers. 
However, results from the small firm sample show no statistically different effects of 
sickness for insured small firm workers compared to uninsured small firm workers.  
The results are somewhat mixed across the various samples. The results from the 
small firm sample that show no effect of health on separations appear to be more 
plausible that the results that show that insured small firm workers are less likely to 
separate than workers in insured large firms. If small firms were screening out workers 
with high health costs, we would expect these workers to be more likely to be laid off. If, 
on the other hand, the separation distortions were due to worker demand for health 
insurance, we would not expect workers in small firms with health insurance to be less 
likely to separate from their jobs than workers in large firms with health insurance. Some 
models show that poor worker health is associated with the expected increase in 
separation in insured small firms. However, given the mixed pattern of results and their 
                                                 
17 The RRRs and coefficients of interaction terms in non-linear models can be misleading; 
therefore we have calculated predictions of the marginal effects and their distribution (Ai and Norton, 
2003). We have also estimated linear probability models instead of multinomial logit models and found 
very similar results. 
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small magnitude in marginal effects, our findings regarding separation distortions remain 
ambiguous. 
 
Supply Side versus Demand Side 
An intriguing question is whether employment distortions are driven by firms 
screening out sick workers (a demand side effect), or by sick workers choosing not to 
work in small firm (a supply side effect). In a market-clearing model with fully adjusting 
wages, it is impossible to distinguish between a demand and a supply side effect. 
However, if we assume that wages are somewhat rigid, then the distinction between 
demand and supply side effects becomes meaningful. Determining whether employment 
distortions are driven by demand or supply side considerations is important for designing 
economic policy. For instance, strengthening anti-discrimination legislation would reduce 
distortions if firm screening were a main factor, whereas improving small firm health 
insurance quality would be more effective if worker sorting was responsible for 
employment distortions. 
   Our results have not provided any definitive evidence of either a firm side or 
worker side story; most likely both play some role. We have found that workers with 
adverse family health are less likely to be hired into small firms that offer health 
insurance compared to any other type of firm. If worker demand were responsible for our 
results, we would expect to see workers with high-expected costs flock to jobs that offer 
health insurance in large and small firms. However, we find that workers with adverse 
health are no more likely to be new hires in large firm jobs that offer health insurance 
than in large firm jobs with no health insurance. They are also less likely to be in small 
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firm insured jobs than in small firm uninsured jobs. This evidence suggests that firm 
screening plays a role in employment distortions. On the other hand, we do find some 
evidence for a worker demand story from the results on dependent health – we find that 
workers with dependents in poor health are more likely to be employed in insured small 
firms compared to uninsured small firms and they are more likely to be employed in 
insured large firms compared to uninsured large firms. However, the results from the 
separation models did not shed any light on the role of firm-side versus worker-side 
effects. Most likely, both firm and worker effects play a role in determining the 
distribution of employment between small and large firms.   
  We also empirically check if wages for insured and sick small firm employees are 
lower than wages for insured and sick large firm employees. If we assume that sick 
workers employed in insured small firms are no more productive than sick workers 
employed in insured large firms, then similar wages by firm size would again suggest that 
small firms would have an incentive not to employ workers with high-expected health 
costs. We find no difference in the wages between insured workers with high-expected 
health costs in large and small firms. 
 
  Effect of State Reform on Employment Distortions 
  We re-estimated the multinomial logit models for new hires, the stock of workers, 
and for separations, after including measures of state small group health insurance reform 
and interactions of the reforms with the family health measures. We find no evidence that 
reforms changed employment patterns. The results on the interaction between reform and 
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health are statistically insignificant for all models. Results from the multinomial logit 
models described in this section are available on request.   
  We also found small and statistically insignificant effects for state reforms on 
each type of employment distortion using alternative measures of state reforms, such as 
individual indicators for portability, type of rating reform, guaranteed issue reforms; for 
alternative definitions of the package of reforms; and for measures of the allowable 
premium variability.  
 
Conclusion 
  This paper determines if the link between employment and health insurance leads 
to distortions in small firm employment. The estimation results show that workers with 
high-expected health costs are less likely to be new hires in small firms that offer health 
insurance than any other type of firm. These workers are also less likely to be employed 
in small firms that offer health insurance. The magnitude of these findings suggest that 
the employment effects are relatively small – workers with high-expected health costs are 
86% as likely to be new hires in insured small firms and 91% as likely to be employed in 
insured small firms relative to insured large firms.  
  Our results suggest that both firm screening and worker sorting play a role in the 
observed employment outcomes. Small firms may be using explicit and implicit 
mechanisms to screen out workers with high expected health costs. Workers with high-
expected health costs are likely to prefer jobs with high quality health insurance policies. 
But our results can be only partially explained by worker sorting. We find that workers 
with high-expected health costs are less likely to be new hires in small firms that offer 
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health insurance than in small firms that do not offer health insurance, contrary to the 
predictions of a worker sorting framework. However, we also find some evidence that 
workers with sick dependents are more likely to be employed in insured small firm jobs 
than in uninsured small firm jobs, and are more likely to be employed in insured large 
firm jobs than uninsured large firm jobs. Most likely, a combination of firm screening 
and worker sorting factors are responsible for the employment outcomes that we observe. 
  A pertinent question in evaluating our results is whether firms can legally screen 
workers with high-expected health costs from employment. ADA prohibits employment 
screening for workers with qualifying disabilities; however, ADA does not apply to firms 
with fewer than 15 employees, leaving these firms open to employment screening. 
Furthermore, we observe the strongest evidence for firm screening during the hiring 
process, when screening may be hard to detect or prove.  
  State small group health insurance reforms coupled with federal HIPAA 
regulation appear to have had little effect on the pattern of employment distortions for 
workers with high-expected health costs. Employment distortions appear to have 
persisted in small firms, despite the wide implementation of these insurance reforms. 
Premium rating regulations, an important component of the state small group reforms, 
were quite weak in most states, and could explain the muted effects we find of reforms on 
small firm employment patterns. 
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TABLE 1: MEANS IN THE MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (1996-2001)
Offer HI Don't Offer HI Offer HI Don't Offer HI
Demographics
Age 38.93 34.57 40.11 32.97
Female 0.49 0.53 0.47 0.57
Married 0.48 0.38 0.51 0.33
White 0.80 0.71 0.76 0.66
Black 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.15
Hispanic 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.15
Other race 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
Family size 2.83 3.09 2.82 3.13
Less than high school 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.19
High School 0.57 0.60 0.50 0.58
College 0.19 0.09 0.23 0.13
More than College 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.04
Other degree 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06
Health
Number of Medical Conditions 1.96 2.04 2.02 2.00
Any Medical Conditions 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.55
Predicted Medical Expenses 1437.85 1559.82 1460.56 1501.52
Job Characteristics
Wage 14.42 8.90 16.95 9.47
Union 0.09 0.01 0.21 0.06
Dual worker family 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.68
Other Characteristics
Region: Northeast 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.19
Region: Midwest 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.23
Region: South 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.33
Region: West 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.25
MSA 0.80 0.78 0.84 0.83
Number of Observations 9010 9018 28989 6446
Small Firms Large Firms
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TABLE 2: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS OF NEW HIRES (1996-2001)
  Categories: Small firm HI, Large firm HI, Small firm no HI, Large firm no HI




















Small Firm: Less than 25
Number of conditions   
  Full Sample 0.942 0.026 ** # 0.946 0.026 ** # 1.012 0.022
  Single Workers 0.936 0.038 * # 0.936 0.036 * # 0.989 0.027
  Married Workers 0.937 0.035 * # 0.946 0.037 # 1.051 0.034
     Worker Health 0.892 0.070 0.829 0.068 ** # 0.951 0.064
     Dependent Health 0.955 0.044 0.995 0.048 1.094 0.044 **
Any conditions  
  Full Sample 0.860 0.062 ** # 0.861 0.065 ** # 1.073 0.067
  Single Workers 0.818 0.080 ** # 0.809 0.079 ** # 1.008 0.080
  Married Workers 0.908 0.097 # 0.909 0.105 1.173 0.113 **
     Worker Health 0.856 0.101 0.822 0.104 0.994 0.107
     Dependent Health 0.905 0.095 0.911 0.102 1.071 0.101
Predicted expenditures  
  Full Sample 0.981 0.010 * # 0.978 0.010 ** # 1.006 0.008
  Single Workers 0.979 0.013 0.973 0.013 ** # 0.996 0.010
  Married Workers 0.981 0.014 0.981 0.015 1.023 0.013 *
     Worker Health 0.980 0.016 0.972 0.017 * # 0.996 0.015
     Dependent Health 0.981 0.014 0.984 0.015 1.016 0.013
  ##
Small Firm: Less than 50   ##
  ##
Number of conditions  
  Full Sample 0.952 0.023 ** # 0.957 0.022 * # 1.024 0.025
  Single Workers 0.938 0.033 * # 0.947 0.030 * # 0.993 0.031
  Married Workers 0.959 0.032 # 0.960 0.032 # 1.084 0.042 **
     Worker Health 0.881 0.063 * # 0.828 0.059 ** # 1.003 0.076
     Dependent Health 0.989 0.040 1.015 0.040 1.120 0.053 **
Any conditions  
  Full Sample 0.901 0.061   # 0.891 0.058 * # 1.120 0.078
  Single Workers 0.877 0.079 # 0.858 0.072 * # 1.027 0.091
  Married Workers 0.939 0.092 # 0.915 0.092 1.287 0.140 **
     Worker Health 0.796 0.086 ** # 0.783 0.087 ** # 1.125 0.136
     Dependent Health 0.988 0.095 0.945 0.091 1.114 0.119
Predicted expenditures  
  Full Sample 0.985 0.009 * # 0.982 0.009 ** # 1.012 0.010
  Single Workers 0.984 0.012 0.978 0.011 ** # 0.999 0.012
  Married Workers 0.986 0.013 0.983 0.013 1.036 0.015 **
     Worker Health 0.970 0.014 ** # 0.966 0.015 ** # 1.013 0.017
     Dependent Health 0.996 0.013 0.993 0.013 1.019 0.015
Number of observations 12059
Note: All models include worker education, sex, age, marital status, race, family size, wage, 
  union, industry, occupation, spouse work status, MSA, region and year dummies.
  Models for married workers also include spousal variables (education and job variables)
** denotes significance at the 5% level. * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Large Firm HI vs. Large 
Firm no HI
Small Firm HI vs. Large 
Firm HI
Small Firm HI vs. Small 
Firm no HI
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TABLE 3: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS OF STOCK (1996-2001)
  Categories: Small firm HI, Large firm HI, Small firm no HI, Large firm no HI




















Small Firm: Less than 25
Number of conditions   
  Full Sample 0.985 0.012   # 0.989 0.014   # 0.983 0.015  
  Single Workers 0.985 0.018 0.970 0.020 0.980 0.017
  Married Workers 0.986 0.015 1.011 0.020 1.012 0.018
     Worker Health 0.983 0.028 0.997 0.038 0.952 0.035
     Dependent Health 0.993 0.023 1.056 0.034 * # 1.084 0.033 **
Any conditions  
  Full Sample 0.909 0.030 ** # 0.966 0.039   # 1.027 0.040  
  Single Workers 0.903 0.041 ** # 0.940 0.051 0.963 0.047
  Married Workers 0.916 0.042 * # 0.993 0.058 1.092 0.063
     Worker Health 0.956 0.046 1.025 0.065 0.949 0.058
     Dependent Health 0.943 0.043 1.069 0.066 1.223 0.073 **
Predicted expenditures  
  Full Sample 0.988 0.004 ** # 0.993 0.005   # 1.001 0.005  
  Single Workers 0.988 0.006 * # 0.989 0.007 0.992 0.007
  Married Workers 0.988 0.006 * # 0.999 0.008 1.011 0.008
     Worker Health 0.995 0.007 1.003 0.009 0.992 0.008
     Dependent Health 0.987 0.006 ** # 0.995 0.008 1.014 0.008 *
  ##
Small Firm: Less than 50   ##
  ##
Number of conditions  
  Full Sample 0.983 0.010 * # 0.986 0.013   # 0.989 0.016  
  Single Workers 0.979 0.015 0.965 0.017 ** # 0.970 0.020
  Married Workers 0.987 0.013 1.009 0.017 1.019 0.022
     Worker Health 0.963 0.025 0.979 0.034 0.959 0.039
     Dependent Health 0.995 0.021 1.059 0.030 ** # 1.088 0.038 **
Any conditions  
  Full Sample 0.923 0.028 ** # 0.963 0.035   # 1.075 0.047 *
  Single Workers 0.904 0.037 ** # 0.923 0.045 * # 1.014 0.056
  Married Workers 0.946 0.039 1.004 0.052 1.140 0.075 **
     Worker Health 0.925 0.039 * # 0.988 0.056 0.972 0.068
     Dependent Health 0.971 0.039   # 1.104 0.060 * # 1.227 0.085 **
Predicted expenditures  
  Full Sample 0.989 0.004 ** # 0.992 0.005   # 1.007 0.006  
  Single Workers 0.986 0.005 ** # 0.986 0.006 ** # 0.999 0.007
  Married Workers 0.992 0.005 1.000 0.007 1.016 0.009 *
     Worker Health 0.989 0.006 * # 0.998 0.008 0.995 0.010
     Dependent Health 0.996 0.005 1.000 0.007 1.016 0.009 *
Number of observations 52437
Note: All models include worker education, sex, age, marital status, race, family size, wage, 
  union, industry, occupation, spouse work status, MSA, region and year dummies.
  Models for married workers also include spousal variables (education and job variables)
** denotes significance at the 5% level. * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Large Firm HI vs. Large 
Firm no HI
Small Firm HI vs. Large 
Firm HI
Small Firm HI vs. Small 
Firm no HI
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TABLE 4: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS OF SEPARATIONS (1996-2001)











Small Firm: Less than 25
Number of 
conditions*HI*Small Firm
  Full Sample 0.938 0.030 ** 0.928 0.038 * 0.963 0.025  0.956 0.032   # 1.001 0
       Prediction: 25th pct -0.008 0.002 * -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0
       Prediction: 50th pct -0.006 0.004 * -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0
       Prediction: 75th pct -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0
  Single Workers 0.946 0.042 0.932 0.054 0.987 0.036 0.975 0.048 1.014 0
  Married Workers 0.929 0.046 0.919 0.054 0.931 0.037 0.929 0.043 0.964 0
     Worker Health 1.077 0.155 0.798 0.142 0.941 0.104 0.911 0.134 1.214 0
     Dependent Health 0.841 0.104 0.901 0.125 0.925 0.088 0.894 0.092 0.873 0
Any conditions*HI*Small 
Firm
  Full Sample 0.859 0.084  0.786 0.114 * 0.956 0.085   0.818 0.115   # 1.006 0
  Single Workers 0.906 0.163 0.884 0.234 1.101 0.152 0.975 0.215 1.084 0
  Married Workers 0.815 0.181 0.739 0.238 0.801 0.136 0.787 0.206 0.833 0
     Worker Health 1.241 0.298 0.725 0.233 0.883 0.160 0.991 0.246 1.412 0




  Full Sample 0.975 0.015 * 0.948 0.021 ** 0.991 0.012  0.972 0.018   # 0.998 0
  Single Workers 0.982 0.023 0.988 0.035 1.012 0.019 0.997 0.029 1.007 0
  Married Workers 0.963 0.029 0.953 0.041 0.964 0.022 0.962 0.033 0.975 0
     Worker Health 1.027 0.033 0.943 0.041 0.982 0.024 0.987 0.033 1.048 0




Quit/Stay Layoff/Stay Quit/Stay Layoff/Stay
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Small Firm: Less than 50   #
Number of 
conditions*HI*Small Firm
  Full Sample 0.927 0.029 ** 0.926 0.037 * 0.947 0.019 ** 0.963 0.028   # 0.998 0.023
       Prediction: 25th pct -0.009 0.002 * -0.004 0.001 -0.005 0.001 * -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
       Prediction: 50th pct -0.007 0.004 * -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002 * -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003
       Prediction: 75th pct -0.004 0.005 * -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 * 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004
  Single Workers 0.892 0.038 ** 0.939 0.053 0.951 0.031 0.968 0.043 0.992 0.030
  Married Workers 0.984 0.047 0.870 0.048 ** 0.951 0.034 0.934 0.037 * # 0.994 0.036
     Worker Health 1.229 0.165 0.802 0.135 0.953 0.094 0.987 0.127 1.255 0.128 *
     Dependent Health 0.919 0.107 0.812 0.112 0.973 0.083 0.863 0.080 0.926 0.081
Any conditions*HI*Small 
Firm
  Full Sample 0.811 0.068 ** 0.830 0.102  0.863 0.069 * 0.834 0.105   # 0.984 0.093
  Single Workers 0.790 0.137 0.883 0.223 1.010 0.127 0.964 0.194 1.011 0.123
  Married Workers 0.952 0.207 0.644 0.194 0.753 0.117 * 0.787 0.183 0.872 0.132
     Worker Health 1.510 0.346 * 0.594 0.179 * 0.947 0.154 0.896 0.198 1.473 0.241 *




  Full Sample 0.961 0.014 ** 0.945 0.020 ** 0.978 0.011 ** 0.975 0.016   # 0.997 0.013
  Single Workers 0.960 0.022 * 0.982 0.033 0.998 0.017 0.995 0.027 0.997 0.016
  Married Workers 0.994 0.029 0.934 0.038 * 0.963 0.020 * 0.962 0.030 0.987 0.020
     Worker Health 1.056 0.033 * 0.922 0.038 ** 0.990 0.022 0.980 0.029 1.055 0.023 *
     Dependent Health 0.960 0.028 0.984 0.039 0.961 0.020 * 0.982 0.028 0.963 0.020 *
Note: All models include the reported health measure, firm size, health insurance, and all two-way interactions between the thr
  Models also include worker education, sex, age, marital status, race, family size, wage, tenure union, industry, occupation, 
  spouse work status, MSA, region and year dummies. Married worker models also include spousal controls.
** denotes significance at the 5% level. * denotes significance at the 10% level.
  For the insured sample, the HI control and interactions are redundant and not included in the model
  For the small firm sample, the small firm control and interactions are redundant and not included in the model
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